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MICHÈLE RIOUX*
‘Marriage of convenience’ or ‘default choice’
(Weintraub 1990; Brunelle and Deblock 1989)? In any
case, turning to the United States and embracing free
trade, Canada and Mexico abandoned economic
nationalism that reached its limits in the 1980s and
made a bet that securing a broadened, safe and prefer-
ential access to their main market, they would take
advantage of North American integration. First, it
would stimulate their stalled economies and restore
growth on new foundations. It would allow them to
use the US market as a springboard for successful and
competitive insertion into the global economy and it
would attract foreign investments looking for a gate-
way to the US market. Other arguments were also
important. In the case of Canada, for example, fear of
losing the advantages gained from the free trade agree-
ment (FTA) signed with the United States in 1987,
and, in the case of Mexico, NAFTA was an opportu-
nity to lock in economic reforms. The United States
had more ambitious goals. The first was to establish a
large open market to enable US businesses to take
advantage of deep integration de jure with their first
and third largest trading partners; the second was to
build on this agreement and accelerate multilateral ne-
gotiations and other negotiations;
the third was to meet the chal-
lenges of relentless globalization,
the revival of European integra-
tion and the rise of Asia as an
economic power. North America
was to become also a model that
would pave the way for the cre-
ation of other regional groupings
(APEC, FTAA, transatlantic
FTA and AGOA) (Deblock and
Turcotte 2003).
The debate on NAFTA had political, legal, econom-
ic, cultural and social dimensions. In Canada and
Mexico, it was seen as a direct threat to national sov-
ereignty, social programs and developmental policies.
In the United States fear of deindustrialization, or by
mass relocations to Mexico were dangers shaping
public opinion and debates. Yet, most pessimistic sce-
narios did not materialize and the US economy expe-
rienced strong growth throughout the 1990s, stimu-
lated by globalization, inflows of foreign investments
and development of new technologies, and this had
positive impacts on growth in Canada and Mexico.
NAFTA, nonetheless, continues to spark debates for
different reasons. First, it has lost much of its appeal
as a model of regionalism, as other models now com-
pete with it, and second, NAFTA has become far less
interesting to investors, and trade inside NAFTA are
dwindling. Third, increasing pressure of internation-
al competition is accompanied in Canada and
Mexico with another economic concern: sluggish
productivity. We will examine these three points in
the following pages, and conclude by asking a most
important question: “is NAFTA running out of
breath as a model of regionalism, and if so, what
should be done about it?”
NAFTA as a model
NAFTA is associated with the emergence of a model
of ‘new regionalism’, referred to as ‘open’ regional-
ism as opposed to the previous models of ‘closed’.
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Table 1
Growth of real GDP and GDP per capita in Canada, Mexico
and the United States
Average annual GDP growth rate (%) Period 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.The formula is well conceived but does not accurate-
ly reflect the reality as any RTA (Regional Trade
Agreement) is preferential and exclusive. The differ-
ence distinguishing new and old ones is, on the one
hand, their institutional characteristics: generally,
they are trade agreements aiming to liberalize trade,
and they are mostly bilateral and they are character-
ized by a contractual approach. On the other hand,
they are directed toward international markets, i.e.
towards the promotion of trade in the broadest sense.
They are also negative, yet in-depth integration
agreements. ‘Negative’ in that they aim to remove
barriers to trade and competition. And ‘deep’
because they also tend to harmonize rules and poli-
cies in different areas of trade and investment with-
out involving the elaboration of common policies
(Lawrence 1996).1
NAFTA is a very comprehensive agreement covering
not just trade in goods (including agriculture and ser-
vices) but also investment, telecommunications, gov-
ernment procurement contracting, intellectual prop-
erty, standards and the movement of business people.
In other words, it seeks as much to open up markets
as to establish common market rules, while avoiding
the negotiation of common policies. NAFTA resem-
bles the European model but it does not go as far as
for example, setting a common competition policy.
Where NAFTA radically differs from the European
model because it is essentially a ‘contractual’ agree-
ment aiming at the sole objectives (Preamble and Art.
102) of establishing a free trade zone subject to a sys-
tem of fair competition, resolving disputes effectively
and promoting trilateral cooperation in various areas
related to the agreement. 
NAFTA binds parties to respect the principle of equal
treatment (national treatment and most favored
nation clause, MFN), with exceptions and other
clauses clearly identified. Also, as with any contract,
parties must comply with the commitments made and
must submit, in cases of dispute, to procedures of
arbitrage and, where applicable, to a binding dispute
settlement system. Its institutions are declined on four
levels:  ministerial (a commission on free trade and
commissions in the areas of environment and labor
cooperation), administrative (coordinators and three
secretariats), legal (dispute settlement) and technical
(groups and working committees). The agreement is
intended only to create an institutional and legal envi-
ronment conducive to free movement of goods and
services, capital and business people. One important
aspect to mention is that, contrary to the ongoing
integration process in Europe, the agreement is not
upgradeable. Some proposals were made to improve
the agreement, notably by President Zedillo who pro-
posed to establish a regional development fund, and
to transform it into a customs union or common cur-
rency union, but these proposals were not pursued
and neither seriously considered.2
NAFTA might not have lead to as much debate if the
United States had not sought to use it for purposes.
The United States’ objectives, however, went far
beyond the North American framework. In the first
place, the agreement was meant to create precedents
and to serve as leverage to advance multilateral nego-
tiations in areas as contentious as investment and
intellectual property rights. Firstly, for example,
Chapter 11 on Investment (Part V) served as a model
for negotiations, which ultimately failed, of a multi-
lateral agreement on investment (MAI) (Gagné 2001).
Secondly, Mexico was to serve as an example, demon-
strating that trade liberalization coupled with contin-
ued reforms could lead to vigorous growth and devel-
opment creating jobs and wealth, and this, in return,
would contribute to reinforce democracy, greater
respect for individual rights, greater economic securi-
ty and control of migration flows. And thirdly, a
strong signal had to be sent to all countries willing to
launch bilateral negotiations with the United States,
in the Americas but also elsewhere in the internation-
al community. In this regard, NAFTA symbolized the
way forward in trade liberalization.
These expectations were obviously exaggerated, if
not unfounded, as in the case of the reduction of
migration flows. Moreover, if negotiations in North
America did in fact have direct impacts on the
Uruguay Round and its results, the US trade agenda
quickly encountered strong resistance – beginning in
the Americas where negotiations were finally
dropped because of a lack of consensus (Summit of
Mar del Plata), but also in the case of APEC and at
the WTO (Deblock 2007). Worse, by engaging in a
bilateral path, the United States somehow freed
everyone the obligation to favor multilateralism,
thus opening a true Pandora’s box. In this regard,
the disastrous Ministerial Conferences in Seattle
(1999) and Cancun (2003) were turning points.
Apart from the fact that they revealed the gap
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1 Integration is said to be positive when it is oriented towards com-
mon goals and shallow when it is limited to trade.
2 The Security and Prosperity Partnership , established in 2005,
helped open discussions on new areas including energy, transport
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between US positions and those
of emerging countries, they de-
monstrated the impossibility of
a multilateral consensus in-
evitably leads to a multiplication
of bilateral and regional chan-
nels as the default solution. The
United States is not solely
responsible for the proliferation
of the spaghetti bowl of trade
agreements, but the doctrine of
‘competitive liberalization’,
which, under the presidency of
George W. Bush, replaced re-
gional blocks and their disinter-
est in multilateralism, only
added fuel to the fire. What is
striking today is not so much the
race towards trade agreements
but rather the new form they take. We have entered a
third wave of regionalism, marked both by the pro-
liferation of agreements in Asia, a region that long
remained outside this trend, and by the emergence of
a different model that we call a ‘partnership’ model,
initiated mainly by China, a new player that every
day affirms and reaffirms its ambitions to shape the
world economy (Beeson 2007). 
The two periods of NAFTA
NAFTA is often criticized, often severe when it comes
to jobs and working conditions (Faux, Salas and
Schott 2006), but its overall record clearly remains pos-
itive, far more so in fact than was initially anticipated
(Courchene 2003; Hufbauer 2008; Pacheco-López
2008). First, it established an institutional framework
conducive to trade, to the great satisfaction of the busi-
ness world. Some disputes – timber, transportation and
sugar for instance – regularly reappear, but they remain
few given the magnitude of trade. Similarly with dis-
putes relating to investment: they remain isolated cases
and arbitration decisions are too uncertain to allow
strong conclusions to be drawn from them.
Furthermore, trade between the three countries experi-
enced a sharp rise. Between 1992 and 2008, exports
from Canada and Mexico to the United States were
multiplied respectively by 3 and 4.5, while their imports
from the United States have been multiplied by 2.5 and
3. As for trade between Canada and Mexico, it has
been multiplied by 6. Finally, even if NAFTA did not
begin auspiciously (Zapatista uprising on 1 January
1994 and the peso crisis by the end of that year),
Mexico recuperated quickly from the crisis, and experi-
enced strong growth led by exports and a booming
maquilas industry. Thus, the num-
ber of jobs in these industries dou-
bled between 1995 and 2000 from
648,263 to 1,291,232.3 Another
compelling fact is that the share of
the manufacturing sector in total
exports went from less than half
the total before NAFTA to more
than 80 percent in the early 2000s
(Waldkirch 2008).
One of NAFTA’s most notewor-
thy effects was to significantly
strengthen the trade links
Table 2
Exports and imports of goods and services 1970–2009 
(% of GDP)
Exports Period 
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Source: United Nations Statistics Division.
Table 3
Growth of US merchandise trade with Canada and Mexico 1980–2009 
(average annual growth rate in %) 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US International Trans-
actions Accounts Data.
3 Source: INEGI.between the three countries. It is
necessary, however, to distinguish
between the period prior to and
after 2000. Before 2000, trade
grew rapidly. Thus, the share of
intra-NAFTA trade between
1994 and 2000 went from 45 per-
cent to 56 percent for exports and
from 37 percent to 40 percent for
imports.4 Thereafter, the share of
intra-NAFTA exports remained
stable until 2005, but then began
to recede slowly before dropping
to 48 percent since the 2008 crisis.
The decline is felt even more
acutely in the import sector.
From 40 percent, the share of
intra-NAFTA imports dropped
to 38 percent in 2005 and then to
33 percent in 2009. Clearly, trade
is slackening and three reasons
explain this. First, Canada and
Mexico benefited from two
advantages during the 1990s:
strong growth in the United
States and weak currencies.
These have disappeared as the
US economy has lost momentum
and the crisis of 2008–2009 has
sharply driven down bilateral
trade while the Canadian dollar
achieved near-parity with the US
dollar and the peso’s real value
rose sharply. Both Canada and
Mexico have lost competitive-
ness, at least in terms of prices
(Morales 2010).
Furthermore, trade conditions have dramatically
changed since China’s accession to the WTO. Chinese
competition is felt at two levels: both within the
United States (the main market for Canada and
Mexico), and in these two countries as well where
Chinese products are challenging local industries and
imports from the United States. Thus, between 1996
and 2008, we have witnessed the share of imports
from China growing from 2.1 percent to 10.1 percent
of total imports in Canada, from 0.8 percent to
10.7 percent in Mexico and from 6.6 percent to
16.5 percent in the United States.5 Conversely, while
US exports to China rose from 1.9 percent to 6.5 per-
cent between 1996 and 2008, this was not the case for
Canada and Mexico: Canada’s exports to China rose
only from 1.1 percent to 2.5 percent and Mexico’s,
from 0.2 percent to 0.7 percent. But what do we have
to offer to China? While Canada has natural
resources and cutting-edge industries in certain sec-
tors, Mexico does not have the advantage of natural
resources, with the exception of petroleum, and its
industries are still very fragile and dependent on inte-
gration with the United States while it is especially
exposed to Chinese competition, with the exception of
the automobile industry (Meza and Salvador 2009;
Rosales and Kuwayama 2007; Arès 2005).
Finally, the third source of concern is the changes in
the direction of direct investments. In Canada, this
phenomenon was observed long ago: in 1994, two
thirds of direct investments (FDI) came from the
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United States. By 2009, only half did, while
Canadian FDI in the United States went from 53 per-
cent to 44 percent of total Canadian FDI abroad.
But it is on the US side that the changes are most
notable. China and Asia general-
ly attract few Canadian compa-
nies, but this is not the case for
US companies which have long
been established in this part of
the world. Figure 3 is very reveal-
ing, giving us the number of jobs
in US subsidiaries (affiliates) in
Canada, Mexico and China for
the manufacturing sector. It
clearly shows that although
NAFTA originally stimulated
job creation in both Canada and
Mexico, that trend has since been
reversed (Blecker 2009).
These contrasting trends reveal
two things. First, NAFTA has
given new impetus to economic
growth in Canada and Mexico
but it has also had the perverse
effect of reinforcing their natur-
al dependence on the United
States. Second, changes in the
international economic environ-
ment have forced both countries
to rethink their economic
strategies, so far much too
focused on the United States
(Goldfarg 2006).
Productivity – the weak link
Did NAFTA divert the attention
of Canadian and Mexican
authorities from considering
other markets and partners? One
can think so. On the one hand,
the agreement was most satisfac-
tory as trade was extremely
favorable to Canada and Mexico
that benefitted from large trade
surpluses year after year. On the
other hand, even when both
countries sought to diversify
their trade, their efforts did not
yield the expected results since
companies did not really re-
sponded, and because the failure of the FTAA pro-
ject revealing the failure of their economic diploma-
cy on the continent. This being said, times have
changed. The United States, increasingly tied up with
Table 4
US merchandise trade with major partners 1980–2009 
(average share of total trade in %)
Exports to  Period 
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US MAJORITY-OWNED FOREIGN AFFILIATES, EMPLOYMENT 1997–2008
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Figure 3
Figure 4China, shows little interest in the Americas while
China has become a major player in the Americas in
only a decade. Both Canada and Mexico are now up
against a wall: how can they preserve their market
shares within North America while gaining shares in
other markets, if not through innovation and invest-
ment in the future?
Low productivity has indeed become a major concern
in Canada and Mexico; no doubt does it also explain
to a large extent the problems of competitiveness that
both countries are faced with today. In this regard,
Figure 4 and Table 5 are most revealing about three
things. First, the hopes for convergence have not been
realized by NAFTA: Mexico has not reduced its pro-
ductivity gap with the United States and, since 2000,
Canada has seen this gap widening. Second, the rate
of productivity growth has been falling dramatically
since 2000, far more than in the United States. And
third, at least for Canada, this gap is mainly due to the
MFP (multi-factor productivity). Many reasons have
been given to explain this fact, but they all converge in
the same directions: (1) low exchange rates combined
with large trade surpluses have not encouraged firms
to invest as much as they should have, and have led to
poor economic decisions; (2) companies have lagged
behind in implementing new technologies and invest-
ing capital, largely because of weak demand for inno-
vation and insufficient pressure from competition;
and (3) political authorities have not been sufficiently
reactive in terms of research and development, inno-
vation and education (Ibarra 2010; Ito 2010; Dion
2007; Fujii, Candaudap and Gaona 2005; Sharpe and
Arsenault 2008).
One of the great objectives of Canada and Mexico
was to use the US market as a springboard, and they
both expected free trade to boost competitiveness.
Both economies have opened outwards significantly
as the share of trade in GDP increasing from 26 per-
cent to 37 percent between the 1980s and 2000s in
the case of Canada, and from 15 percent to 27 per-
cent for Mexico. But, this opening has largely been
due to integration trade with the United States and
it has not spurred much growth as was expected. One
should be cautious in this respect. It would be disin-
genuous to say that NAFTA did not produce
dynamic effects. Quite the contrary, as evidenced by
the very high ranking of Canada’s Competitiveness
Index of the World Economic Forum (10th) or, in
the case of Mexico, the technological composition of
exports, higher than that of Canada. Even though,
the fact remains that both countries suffer from seri-
ous weaknesses in innovation and investment, with
Mexico even receding on the scale of global compet-
itiveness (66th in 2010). All in all, if a cause must be
found for the difficulties faced by both countries in
diversifying their trade, it lies in the shortcomings of
both governments and businesses and not in
NAFTA primarily.
This is indeed one of the great lessons to be learned
from the experience of NAFTA. Trade liberalization
offers windows of opportunity and in this sense,
NAFTA, by creating an environment favorable to
trade, has allowed Canada and Mexico to seize this
opportunity, and turn North American to their
advantage. Of course, we cannot compare Canada
and Mexico, still an emerging country which, despite
the reforms, still suffers from economic rigidities,
structural weaknesses and severe inequalities. But it
is also clear that in order to lead to results a policy
of export-led growth must be supported by invest-
ments and endogenous growth policies which priori-
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tize innovation, research and education, without
neglecting the domestic market (Zeda, Wise and
Gallagher 2009).
Conclusion: time for a change?
NAFTA will turn twenty in 2013. It should be given
credit for having significantly strengthened economic
ties among Canada, the United States and Mexico
and thus to have contributed to the revitalization of
national economies. It is, however, far from having
achieved all the objectives that the governments were
aiming at when they signed the agreement. One can
identify gaps and deficiencies in this integration
model, especially in terms of economic and political
convergence as well as in terms of inequalities, which
remains a problem. One can also point to the limits of
a trilateral cooperation that is far too circumscribed
for adequate management of the agreement and to
the fact that it triggered a proliferation of trade agree-
ments that led to a messy international trading sys-
tem. But the focus of this article is not so much to
address these shortcomings of NAFTA as to empha-
size the fact that while well adapted to the context of
the 1990s, NAFTA is much less adapted to the reality
of the 2000s. Is the NAFTA model running out of
breath? One can readily answer ‘YES’.
To put it simply, there is a before 2000 and an after
2000. The institutional model of NAFTA is now
much less convincing than it was in the 1990s. As a
model of integration, it is also weakened by changes
in international economic trends. Both in Canada and
Mexico, the stimulating effects of regional integration
seem exhausted or, at least, insufficient to stimulate
investment and productivity. Economic conditions
have changed: neither Canada nor Mexico can now
count on the US locomotive, let alone surf on a favor-
able exchange rate as before. In both Canada and
Mexico, the dramatic drop in bilateral trade with the
United States in 2009 was cause for concern.
Although trade has indeed resumed vigorously in
2010, these worries remain. Fear, as they say, is the
beginning of wisdom. Or at least, in these spreading
concerns, the crisis should be credited for reminding
us not only that competitiveness is built first at home,
but also that regional integration cannot be reduced
to a simple exercise in trade diplomacy. NAFTA is
certainly out of breath and even outdated, but too
many interests are at stake and the current challenges
are too important to let things go astray (Schott 2008;
Alexandroff, Hufbauer and Lucenti 2008). In this
sense, the crisis offers an opportunity to redefine the
framework of regional cooperation, and to rethink
terms of integration that do not rely primarily on
market forces, as it has been the case until now.
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